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RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CONTRACTING OFFICER 
REPRESENTATIVES, SURVEILLANCE, AND CONTRACTOR 
PERFORMANCE 
ABSTRACT 
 The Air Force has found itself expanding contracted services at the installation 
level due to a decrease in manpower across several specialties. These additional 
requirements demand surveillance, but also bring into light the effectiveness of 
contracting officer representatives (COR) when dealing with complex services. The 
intent of this project is to analyze whether the COR experience, training, and surveillance 
frequency have an impact on contractor performance. This analysis includes a review of 
COR training and experience retrieved from the Contracting Officer Representative 
Tracking Tool (CORTT). Moreover, it includes a review of Quality Assurance 
Surveillance Plans (QASP) and the frequency of reports in the same system. It also 
includes a review of policy surrounding surveillance, training, and experience 
requirements. Finally, the results are compared with Contractor Performance Assessment 
Reporting System (CPARS) data that states the performance of service contracts. The 
intent is to determine whether statistically significant relationships exist between quality 
assurance programs and contractor performance. 
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The installation-level support requirements, such as aircraft maintenance or 
communications, have significantly increased across the Air Force. The Air Force has 
incorporated these increased requirements into their contracts for these services. The 
increase in the contracting of these support requirements results in the importance of 
contractor performance for these requirements.  
In fiscal year (FY) 2016, the Department of Defense (DoD) spent close to $150 
billion in contracted services (Government Accountability Office [GAO], 2018). This 
number has steadily increased since 2016 with a recorded $163.7 billion spent on services 
compared to the $163.8 billion spent on products (Office of the Under Secretary of Defense 
for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics [OUSD(ATL)]), 2017). The $163 billion 
encompassed several categories of contracted services, the largest of which are knowledge-
based services, research and development services, facility services, and equipment-related 
services (OUSD[ATL], 2017), which all support installations across the DoD. 
The increase in services performed by contractors drives an increase in contractor 
surveillance performed by the government. The level of experience, training, surveillance 
frequency, and quality plan of government monitors give the contracting officer critical 
information to manage the performance of DoD contractors. Determining how the overall 
quality assurance program relates to contractor performance is critical in the contract 
management process.  
B. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
The level of experience, training, surveillance frequency, and quality plan of 
government monitors differs based on the contracted services at the installation. These 
differences may lead to different levels of contractor performance. Several standards have 
been implemented to standardize training, experience, and surveillance, but it is not yet 
clear whether there is a relationship between these factors and contractor performance. The 
success of contracted services depends on the effectiveness of the quality assurance 
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program, which consists of the government monitor experience, training, surveillance 
frequency, and plan. The question is whether the quality assurance program is effective in 
managing contractor performance.  
C. PURPOSE OF RESEARCH 
The purpose of this research is to determine how the government quality assurance 
program (experience, training, surveillance frequency, and quality plan) impacts contractor 
performance. Determining the impact could lead to an increased level of contract 
management capability within the DoD. 
D. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
This research answers the following questions: 
1. What is the relationship between the government monitor experience and 
contractor performance?  
2. What is the relationship between government monitor training and 
contractor performance?  
3. What is the relationship between the surveillance frequency, quality plan, 
and contractor performance?  
E. METHODOLOGY 
This is a quantitative research project. The research methodology encompasses 
collecting data about the government monitors and contractor performance for services. 
Government monitor information comes from the Contracting Officer Representative 
Tracking Tool (CORTT) and contractor performance comes from Contractor Performance 
Assessment Reporting System (CPARS). 
Extracting data from CORTT depicts the level of experience and training for the 
contracting officer representative (COR). The data set also provides monthly surveillance 
frequency along with the adequacy of Quality Assurance Surveillance Plans (QASP). The 
CPARS data provides information about yearly contractor performance. The CORTT is 
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compared with CPARS data. The two data sets reveal relationships, and lack thereof, that 
exists between the quality assurance program and contractor performance.  
F. BENEFITS AND LIMITATIONS 
The purpose of this research is to determine how the government’s quality 
assurance program (experience, training, surveillance frequency, and plan) impacts 
contractor performance. Findings from this research will provide the DoD with more 
effective ways to manage contractor performance on services contracts. 
For example, if the research reveals that COR contract experience is positively 
related to contractor performance, this research can support an increase of contract 
experience requirements when selecting CORs. Furthermore, a positive relationship 
between COR experience and contractor performance may allow the DoD to focus on 
appointing more CORs who have superior technical experience relating to the particular 
service requirement. Additionally, a strong correlation between surveillance frequency and 
contractor performance may lead organizations to increase surveillance of contracted 
services.  
On the other hand, a negative relationship between the quality assurance program 
and contractor performance can help guide the development of new management priorities 
to manage contractor performance. Findings of this research can also aid in the structure 
of quality assurance programs to more adequately manage contractor performance.  
Limitations of this research include the sample size of the data collected. 
Furthermore, the quality of data obtained between installations differs due to differing 
willingness to grant access to source selection sensitive information.  
Moreover, the sample size is limited to contracts from three U.S. Air Force 
installations with varying missions. This effectively excludes all other DoD organizations. 
Furthermore, narratives from the CPARS system are excluded due to their Source Selection 
Sensitive nature and due to the lack of time available to translate narratives into qualitative 
data. The contracts used also exclude military construction (MILCON) projects and 
weapon system or supporting contracts.  
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G. ORGANIZATION OF REPORT 
This research is organized into five distinct sections to reveal how the government’s 
quality assurance program (COR experience, training, surveillance frequency, and Quality 
Assurance Surveillance Plan [QASP]) impacts overall contractor performance. The 
research comprises an introduction, a literature review, the research methodology, an 
analysis of the findings, and a conclusion, containing a summary and areas for further 
research.  
Chapter I introduces the research. It also discusses the background of the quality 
assurance program and the management of contractor performance. Furthermore, it 
presents the problem statement, purpose, and research questions for this research, followed 
by the methodology, benefits and limitations, and organization of the report. Finally, it 
summarizes the direction of this research.  
Chapter II, the literature review, consists of academic theory describing interactions 
between the government and the contractor as well as a detailed overview of the service 
contracting process. It also includes a review of the service contracting team members 
pertinent to this research and a discussion of current COR training and experience 
requirements. Furthermore, it discusses the DoD’s methods of contractor surveillance 
along with policy and guidance for developing Quality Assurance Surveillance Plans 
(QASP). Moreover, this chapter addresses CPARS and current issues the DoD faces in 
recording contractor performance. Finally, it presents previous studies regarding 
management of contractor performance.  
The research methodology chapter, Chapter III, includes a discussion of how this 
research was conducted. It explains data collection methods and the manner in which 
qualitative data was converted into quantitative data. Moreover, it reviews the primary 
model used for analysis data to determine if there is a relationship between the quality 
assurance program and contractor performance.  
Chapter IV, the analysis and implications of findings chapter, applies linear 
regression and correlation formulas to determine the relationship between the quality 
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assurance program and contractor performance. It also provides additional findings that 
were not necessarily part of the model yet relevant to the research.  
The summary, conclusions, and areas for further research are in Chapter V and 
make critical implications and statements about how the quality assurance program (COR 
training, experience, surveillance frequency, and QASPs) impacts overall contractor 
performance. Additionally, it makes recommendations for further research. 
H. SUMMARY 
This chapter introduced how this research intends to determine how the quality 
assurance program (COR experience, training, surveillance frequency, and QASPs) 
impacts contractor performance.  
The chapter introduced a problem faced by the DoD: Does its quality assurance 
program effectively manage contractor performance? The chapter introduced research 
questions along with the methods used in answering those questions. The purpose of this 
research is to determine how the government’s quality assurance program (experience, 
training, surveillance frequency, and plan) impacts contractor performance. 
Additionally, this chapter included a discussion of the benefits and limitations of 
the research along with the overall organization of the report. The following literature 
review discusses the current literature, guidance, and available policy relevant to 




THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK  
 7 
II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this research is to determine how the quality assurance program 
(experience, training, surveillance frequency, and plan) impacts contractor performance. 
This chapter presents a theoretical basis and how it relates to the quality assurance program 
and the management of contractor performance. This chapter also supports this research 
by discussing the DoD’s service contract management process. Additionally, this chapter 
discusses the members of the service contracting team, COR training, and experience 
requirements. Moreover, this chapter reviews regulations that enable the management of 
contractor performance, the methods used to manage contractor performance, and the 
QASP. Furthermore, it discusses how the government uses CPARS to record contractor 
performance. Also, this chapter discusses the challenges observed by the DoD and external 
agencies, which further reinforce the need to answer the research questions surrounding 
the DoD’s quality assurance program and contractor performance. Finally, this chapter 
offers a review of academic work completed on the topic of the quality assurance program 
and contractor performance.  
B. THEORETICAL BASIS (AGENCY AND AUDITABILITY THEORY) 
The government’s use of a quality assurance program to manage contractor 
performance stems from agency theory. Agency theory is an economic theory that can be 
applied to contracts between a principal and agent: the government and a contractor 
(Rendon, 2015). The theory focuses on the presence of competing objectives between the 
principal and the agent (Rendon, 2015). For example, the government is charged with 
ensuring that dollars spent are producing acceptable services, while the contractor is 
concerned with meeting profit objectives and increasing shareholder value (Rendon, 2015).  
Matters between the principal and agent are further complicated due to information 
asymmetry (Rendon, 2015). The government tends to have more information about their 
mission, while the contractor has more information on what cost drivers are involved in 
meeting a particular requirement (Rendon, 2015). 
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The presence of competing objectives and information asymmetry leads to 
discretionary behavior (Rendon, 2015). Rendon further elaborates that discretionary 
behavior can result in either consummate or perfunctory decisions that lessen the likelihood 
of both the principal and agent meeting their objectives. The principal can establish 
mechanisms to mitigate adverse selection, such as conducting market research (Rendon, 
2015). Also, the principal can set up mechanisms to counter the effects of moral hazard 
during contract performance, such as the establishment of a quality assurance program 
(Rendon, 2015).  
A quality assurance program can be useful in countering the effects of moral 
hazard, but only if the principal incorporates the concepts of auditability theory.  
Auditability theory leverages governance concepts whilst highlighting effective 
internal controls, capable processes, and competent personnel (Rendon & Rendon, 2015). 
When referencing quality assurance programs and contractor performance, “internal 
controls” refers to the government’s ability to report material weaknesses and enforce 
compliance with laws and regulations (Rendon & Rendon, 2015). 
“Capable processes” refers to the services contracting team’s ability to perform 
contract administration and closeout functions, including managing contractor 
performance (Rendon, 2015). Finally, an aspect of auditability theory called “competent 
personnel” focuses on ensuring that personnel are adequately trained and experienced to 
perform their assigned responsibilities (Rendon, 2015). In this research, competency is 
applied to whether members of the service contracting team have the adequate experience 
and training.  
Agency theory and auditability theory provide a theoretical basis from which to 
analyze the quality assurance program and management of contractor performance. 
Furthermore, the theories create a basis from which to discuss the remaining sections in 
this chapter.  
The following section discusses the service contracting process the DoD uses to 
achieve its objectives.  
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C. SERVICE CONTRACTING PROCESS 
The service contract management process is described in the Contract Management 
Body of Knowledge (CMBOK) as consisting of three phases: pre-award, award, and post-
award (National Contract Management Association [NCMA], 2017). Several 
competencies exist within the three phases. The remainder of this section focuses on these 
three phases and the activities performed in each phase: acquisition planning, requesting 
offers, and source selection (NCMA, 2017). The remainder of this section focuses on the 
pre-award, award, and post-award phases and the activities in each.  
The pre-award phase includes acquisition planning, which involves the 
coordination and integration of multiple efforts to satisfy an organization’s needs in a 
timely and reasonable manner (NCMA, 2017). Acquisition planning includes definition of 
requirements as well as preparation for all necessary acquisition actions to include 
negotiation (NCMA, 2017). It also includes the discussion of acquisition constraints, 
performance requirements, cost/technical/schedule risks, and tradeoffs (NCMA, 2017). 
Furthermore, the acquisition plan discusses the contract type (firm fixed or cost 
reimbursement) that would best suit the buyer’s needs (NCMA, 2017). These steps support 
the development of an actual solicitation that can be sent to offerors (NCMA, 2017). 
The pre-award phase also includes a solicitation (NCMA, 2017). A solicitation 
constitutes the intentional selection of standardized documents to aid in offerors submitting 
proposals. (NCMA, 2017). NCMA (2017) also states that the documents include template 
contracts, standard forms, description of needs, and terms and conditions that adequately 
protect both parties. 
The final steps in the pre-award phase are requesting offers and conducting source 
selection, which ultimately lead to a contract (NCMA, 2017). NCMA states that requesting 
offers begins by validating the solicitation package and then publicizing the opportunity 
through approved methods to obtain proposals and incite competition. Giving offerors 
sufficient time and information leads to increased competition, which supports the success 
of the acquisition (NCMA, 2017).  
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The award phase begins with source selection, which is the process of determining 
which company wins a contract (NCMA, 2017). Source selection considers the evaluation 
of factors stated in solicitation packages and sometimes involves negotiations with offerors 
(NCMA, 2017). Source selection also considers the past performance of a contractor along 
with their ability to successfully meet the requirement (contractor responsibility; CMBOK, 
2017). Once source selection is completed, a contract is awarded and the final phase, post-
award, begins (NCMA, 2017).  
The post-award phase consists of critical functions: contract administration, 
ensuring quality, subcontract management, managing changes, and contract closeout 
(NCMA, 2017).  
Contract administration begins with strong and effective communication (NCMA, 
2017). Strong and effective communication includes having two-way dialogue that enables 
contract performance (NCMA, 2017). This can be achieved through meetings, written 
reports, and verbal methods of communication (NCMA, 2017). 
Contract administration also includes observing, monitoring, and documenting 
performance (NCMA, 2017). Observation and monitoring help the buyer verify that parties 
are either acting consummately or perfunctorily (NCMA, 2017). This can then activate 
different terms and conditions within the contract to correct behavior (NCMA, 2017). 
Observation and monitoring reveal any issues that might exist in the cost, schedule, or 
performance of the contract (NCMA, 2017). Recording performance is also an important 
aspect because it can serve as a written record that can assist with future actions between 
the buyer and seller (NCMA, 2017).  
Contract administration also includes resolving any disagreements between both 
parties (NCMA, 2017). Disagreements are usually in the manner of claims against parties 
or requests of equitable adjustments (NCMA, 2017).  
Ensuring quality focuses on making sure that products or services received by the 
buyer are meeting particular industry or contract standards (NCMA, 2017). This includes 
the implementation of quality assurance tools such as continuous process improvement, six 
sigma, and International Standards Organization (NCMA, 2017). It also includes 
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acceptance testing and inspection of specific articles and services (NCMA, 2017). Ensuring 
quality also emphasizes the recording of any issues or successes so that the buyer can have 
an accurate performance record for future actions between the buyer and the seller (NCMA, 
2017).  
Subcontractor management is usually a function performed by the seller (NCMA, 
2017). The buyer appoints the seller as the single point of contact for managing 
subcontractors (NCMA, 2017). The seller’s responsibility to manage subcontractors means 
that the buyer (in this research, the government) has no privity of contract with 
subcontractors (NCMA, 2017). The lack of privity makes it difficult to enforce sanctions 
and incentives for subcontractor behavior (NCMA, 2017). The lack of privity ultimately 
creates issues when trying to manage contractor performance (NCMA, 2017). Fortunately, 
flow-down clauses that apply to subcontractors are enforceable by the buyer (NCMA, 
2017). 
Terms and conditions between the buyer and seller may change throughout the life 
of the contract (NCMA, 2017). These changes are defined through change management 
(NCMA, 2017). Change management encompasses processing modifications to terms and 
conditions in a manner that adequately defines the requirement and contract performance 
(NCMA, 2017). Changes can be either bilateral (both parties must agree) and unilateral 
(only one party has to agree) (NCMA, 2017). The type of change is mostly dictated by its 
nature (NCMA, 2017). Equitable adjustments were money has to be exchanged tends to be 
bilateral while administrative changes end up being unilateral. (NCMA, 2017).  
Contract closeout is the final step in the post-award phase of contracting (NCMA, 
2017). Closing out a contract relies heavily on the quality and quantity of work performed 
during contract administration in order to validate that all terms and conditions of the 
contract have been met (NCMA, 2017). Closing out a contract includes verifying receipt 
and acceptance of all services (NCMA, 2017). This includes verifying that all payments to 
the contractor have been made (NCMA, 2017). It also involves returning or disposing of 
exchanged property, closing subcontracts, and obtaining final patent and royalty reports 
(NCMA, 2017). Furthermore, closing out a contract includes closing out any open disputes 
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or claims, signing documentation stating contract completion, and de-obligating any funds 
that may still be allocated to the effort (NCMA, 2017).  
The remainder of this chapter is focused on specific government functions 
performed post award that compose the quality assurance program and encompass 
management of contractor performance. These functions are performed by members of the 
services contracting team. The following section introduces key members of the service 
contracting team. 
D. SERVICE CONTRACTING TEAM 
The Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) states that the intent of acquisition is to 
obtain the best value for the organization in a way that achieves public policy objectives, 
retains the public’s trust, and meets requirement in a timely manner (FAR, 2018). To do 
so, the FAR also establishes the need for integrated teams and empowers them to make 
sound decisions within their scope of responsibilities (FAR, 2018).  
Members include subject matter experts, acquisition professionals, the customer, 
and the contractors who meet the customer’s needs (FAR, 2018). The DoD’s approach is 
not dissimilar from concepts adopted within commercial sectors. The benefit is that 
integrated product teams (IPT) improve efficiency within a team and therefore within the 
organization (Monczka, 2012).  
The key members of the service contracting team that this research focuses on are 
the contracting officer and the contracting officer representative (COR).  
“Contracting officers have authority to enter into, administer, or terminate contracts 
and make related determinations and findings.” (FAR, 2018, Part 1). They are solely 
authorized to bind the government into a contract (FAR, 2018, Part 1). They may not bind 
the government beyond the authority which they are given (FAR, 2018, Part 1). When it 
comes to contract administration, the government typically appoints an administrative 
contracting officer. Administrative contracting officers are charged with executing contract 
administration functions, such as managing contractor performance (NCMA, 2017). The 
ACO appoints a contracting officer representative (COR) to manage the contractor’s 
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performance (NCMA, 2017). The COR is a technical expert on the services being 
contracted, such as an aircraft mechanic for an aircraft maintenance contract (NCMA, 
2017). They are not experts in the contracting field (NCMA, 2017).  
The role of the COR is pivotal in the management of contractor performance (FAR, 
2018). They provide technical guidance to the ACO in regard to statements of work and 
contract specifications (FAR, 2018). CORs also keep the ACO updated on the overall status 
of the contract (FAR, 2018). 
COR duties include reporting compliance with terms and conditions, the 
contractor’s ability to perform the contract, and security violations that may impact the 
organization. CORs accomplish their duties through various surveillance methods and 
record their observations for future use in acquisition.  
The key members of the services contracting team are pivotal in building the quality 
assurance program and managing contractor performance. Due to their criticality, the DoD 
establishes experience and training requirements. The following section discusses the 
experience and training requirements for CORs.  
E. COR TRAINING AND EXPERIENCE REQUIREMENTS  
Having the proper amount of people performing acquisition functions in an 
organization is insufficient (Rendon, Apte, & Apte, 2012). It is equally important to make 
sure people who are performing acquisition functions are trained appropriately (Rendon, 
Apte, & Apte, 2012). As discussed in earlier sections, auditability theory demands that the 
people performing contract management functions possess the correct experience and 
training. The DoD has implemented standards for training and experience in order to select 
successful CORs that contribute to a strong quality assurance program.  
All CORs must be employees of the U.S. government or foreign government 
partners, and they cannot be contractor personnel (DoD, 2015). CORs must be assigned for 
all service contracts or in any other instance the contracting officer determines a COR is 
necessary (DoD, 2015).  
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CORs must also meet training and experience requirements that vary based on the 
complexity of the requirement (DoD, 2015). These requirements include several courses 
taught through the Defense Acquisition University and the local contracting office (DoD, 
2015). Requirements are also met through experiences that showcase the needed 
competencies for the complexity of the contract (DoD, 2015). The three generalized types 
of work range from Type A to C (DoD, 2015).  
Type A contracts do not typically have technical or administrative complexity 
(DoD, 2015). Furthermore, they are not very risky and have a low likelihood of needing 
renegotiation (DoD, 2015). Additionally, Type A contracts tend to be standing 
requirements that have previously been met with similar contracts (DoD, 2015). In these 
scenarios, a CORs training and experience requirements are minimal. Experience 
requirements include working in the agency for at least six months, relevant technical 
experience in regard to the contracted service, and general competencies with business and 
performance management (DoD, 2015).  
DAU and DoD training requirements for Type A contracts include the following 
(DoD, 2015):  
• Contracting Officer’s Representative with a Mission Focus 
• COR in a Contingency Environment (when applicable) 
• Wide Area Workflow (WAWF) Use 
• component-provided ethics training 
• any additional training required by the local contracting office (DoD, 
2015, p. 27) 
CORs are also required to complete refresher training (DoD, 2015). The refresher 
must include eight hours of COR-specific training every three years or before assuming the 
role of a COR, or if they have not conducted COR roles for the previous two years (DoD, 
2015). They must also complete additional refresher training as dictated by their local 
 15 
contracting office (DoD, 2015). Additional details on competencies, experience, and 
training requirements are listed in Appendix Table 2. 
Type B contract requirements demand a higher level of training and experience for 
CORs because of the increase in risk and technical and contractual complexity (DoD, 
2015). Their technical expertise will guide them in interpreting technical deliverables and 
executing complex contract surveillance. CORs in Type B contracts must possess a 
minimum of 12 months of experience in contract surveillance within the organization (e.g., 
U.S. Air Force), have relevant technical experience, and meet a broader list of general 
competencies (DoD, 2015). 
CORs in Type B contracts must meet all previously established training 
requirements for CORs assigned to Type A contracts, but the DAU course is replaced with 
a course called Contracting Officer’s Representative (DoD, 2015).  
Refresher training for CORs on Type B contracts includes a minimum of 16 hours 
every three years, before assuming responsibilities, and if they have not served as a COR 
within the previous two years (DoD, 2015). Additional details on competencies, 
experience, and training are articulated in Appendix Table 3.  
CORs assigned to Type C contracts are required to have the highest training and 
experience because of the unique nature of these contracts (DoD, 2015). The most notable 
difference is the requirement to complete specialized or technical training that will aid with 
the management of the contract (DoD, 2015). Additional information can be referenced in 
Appendix Table 4.  
COR training requirements are clear and well-communicated within regulations as 
instructions as demonstrated in Appendix and through the analysis within this section. The 
same level of clarity and communication is also present for contract language enabling the 
management of contractor performance. The following section presents how the Federal 
Acquisition Regulation (FAR) enables CORs to manage contractor performance. 
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F. MANAGING CONTRACTOR PERFORMANCE 
The federal government has guidance and clauses within the FAR to manage 
quality, which relates to contractor performance, when contracting for services. The 
guidance and clauses give the government specific rights to inspect services in a manner 
that protects the government’s interests (FAR, 2018, Part 46). This section discusses the 
types of contract quality requirements along with key clauses that enable the government 
to manage contractor performance.  
Contract quality requirements fall into four general categories and are used as 
appropriate for contracted services (FAR, 2018, Part 46). First, for commercial items, the 
government is directed to use customary market practices (the contractor’s quality system; 
FAR, 2018, Part 46). The only time the government should substitute the commercial 
practices, in ways such as in-process inspection, is when doing so would not interfere with 
standard processes for the industry (FA, 2018, Part 46).  
Second, government reliance on inspection by the contractor directs that the 
government will not inspect articles or services unless the contracting officer determines 
that government inspections are in the best interests of the government (FAR, 2018, Part 
46). The determination of best interest includes quantifying the expected losses for 
defective work, the likelihood of the contractor replacing defective articles or services, and 
the cost of conducting inspections (FAR, 2018, Part 46).  
Third, standard inspection requirements require a quality inspection system that 
both parties agree on (FAR, 2018, Part 46). They must also allow the government to 
conduct inspections and tests of items or services while in progress (FAR, 2018, Part 46). 
Finally, the contractor has to keep complete records of their inspection work and make 
them accessible to the government (FAR, 2018, Part 46).  
Fourth, higher-level contract quality requirements are normally reserved for critical 
items and services. Higher-level contract quality is typically reserved for items or services 
that require attention to organization, planning, working instructions, documentation 
control, and advanced metrology (FAR, 2018, Part 46).  
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The four types of contract quality requirements set precedence for terms and 
conditions to apply in contracts to manage contractor performance. The clauses used are 
discussed in the following paragraphs.  
The clause titled “Inspection of Services-Fixed Price” gives the federal government 
the ability to protect its interest when dealing with services acquired using fixed price 
contracts (FAR, 2018, 52.246). It directs that the contractor implements an inspection 
system that both parties can agree on (FAR, 2018, 52.246). The clause also describes the 
government’s ability to inspect work without causing delays (FAR, 2018, 52.246). It also 
gives the government the right to perform an inspection on the contractor premises if 
needed (FAR, 2018, 52.246). The most potent power the clause gives the government is 
the right to demand reperformance of services if they do not meet standards, without an 
increase of costs (FAR, 2018, 52.246). If the contractor cannot reperform the services, the 
government has the right to modify the contract to account for the services not performed 
and terminate the contract for default if needed (FAR, 2018, 52.246).  
The Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DFARS) includes 
additional provisions for quality assurance on services as well. One of them includes 
252.236-7009, Option for Supervision and Inspection Services, which gives the 
government the right to direct the contractor to perform any part or all of the supervisions 
and inspection services related to a construction contract (DFARS, 2018, 252.236-7009). 
The DoD also establishes the need to develop plans on how to conduct quality assurance, 
which should focus on areas that are inherently risky when being performed through 
contract (DFARS, 2018, 237.171-4).  
The Air Force has developed a thorough instruction to guide the prescriptions in 
the FAR and DFARS, Air Force Instruction 63–138, Acquisition of Services. The main 
objective of this instruction is to highly leverage the contractor’s quality management and/
or inspection system (Department of the Air Force [DAF], 2017). They implemented a 
four-step model to evaluate the effectiveness of a contractor’s quality management system. 
The steps in the model are detection, identification, correction, and follow up (DAF, 2017). 
Detection focuses on finding problems and defects within the contractor’s quality 
management program. Identification focuses on the root causes to the aforementioned 
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issues. The correction step is designed to solve root causes of quality issues. Finally, the 
follow-up step is designed to ensure quality-related problems and defects do not reoccur 
(DAF, 2017). Figure 1 demonstrates the process discussed previously. 
 
Figure 1.  Quality Management System. Adapted from DAF (2017, p. 34) 
According to the Department of the Air Force instructions on contract management, 
that the primary responsibility of quality assurance and oversight is to assess the Quality 
Management System (QMS) and inform program managers and contracting officers of any 
deviation in quality (DAF, 2017). This begins with pre-award actions, such as aligning 
service summary performance objectives with Contractor Performance Assessment 
Reporting System rating areas and making sure the performance objectives are measurable 
and able to be surveilled (DAF, 2017). The AFI also directs that performance objectives 
can be adequately evaluated by government personnel and contractor quality management 
systems. The government personnel evaluation methodology is described within a Quality 
Assurance Surveillance Plan, discussed in greater detail later in this report.  
After contract award, the focus shifts on validating whether the contractor’s QMS 
is detecting performance issues before the COR is detecting those performance issues. 
Post-award quality assurance also validates the balance between inspections being 
performed by the government and the contractor (DAF, 2017).  
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Significant importance is placed on making sure the government is not replacing 
the contractor’s own quality assurance system while retaining the right to refuse or request 
reperformance of defective services. The government implements their rights in the form 
of a Quality Assurance Surveillance Plan (QASP). The following section describes the 
purpose and contents of a QASP.  
G. QUALITY ASSURANCE SURVEILLANCE PLAN 
“The purpose of a QASP is to provide a planned process for surveilling the 
contractor’s actual performance and comparing that performance against the contractual 
requirements to determine conformity with the technical requirements of the contract.” 
(DAF, 2017, p. 43). The Department of the Air Force’s intent is to encompass the following 
(DAF, 2017): 
• Performance planning and preparation  
• performance assessment surveillance  
• performance results analysis and reporting 
• performance follow-up with all parties to correct performance issues. 
The QASP also contains the minimum required surveillance requirements which 
will vary based on the risk associated with the contracted services (DAF, 2017). It also 
specifically lists the surveillance methods that will be used, along with the frequency (DAF, 
2017). This plan is normally approved by the contracting officer, program manager and/or 
unit commander, and the quality assurance program coordinator (DAF, 2017).  
The Defense Acquisition Guide (DAG), as hosted by Defense Acquisition 
University (DAU), provides a general set of questions that the document should answer 
once completed:  
• Is the value of evaluating the contractor’s performance on a certain task 
worth the cost of surveillance?  
• Has customer feedback been incorporated into the QASP?  
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• Have assessment tools, i.e., methods of surveillance, sampling guides, etc., 
been provided in the QASP? (DAU, 2018)  
The DAG also provides templates in order to facilitate the creation of documents. 
These templates include listing the guiding principles behind surveillance (mission, vision, 
and purpose). Moreover, they include the authority for development of a QASP and the 
specific roles and responsibilities of the program manager, contracting officer, COR, other 
key government personnel, and contractor provided representatives. The templates also list 
the definition of performance as displayed in the contract and CPARS, which typically 
range from unsatisfactory to excellent/outstanding (DAU, 2018). Finally, the QASP 
discusses how performance will be reported and documented (DAU, 2018).  
The QASP ensures all key personnel are aware of the methods through which the 
government evaluates contractor performance. The following section describes the 
methods used by the government when evaluating contractor performance.  
H. GOVERNMENT SURVEILLANCE METHODS 
The government retains the right to inspect all services performed by a contractor 
to the extent that is practicable for both parties (DAF, 2017). This can be done through four 
main types of surveillance: 100% inspections, periodic surveillance, customer complaint, 
or audit reviews (DAF, 2017). The methods chosen for specific service contracts should 
aim to implement adequate risk management (DAF, 2017).  
The 100% inspection method should primarily be used for contracts that do not 
occur frequently, are critical to the mission, or have stringent performance requirements 
(DAF, 2017). The COR’s job is to inspect the contractor’s performance every time they 
are performing services (DAF, 2017).  
Periodic surveillance methods involve any method in which the COR inspects less 
than 100% of the time (DAF, 2017). This may include monthly or quarterly inspections or 
methods that encompass target areas (DAF, 2017). It can also include spot inspections or 
random samples of specific performance objectives within the performance work statement 
(DAF, 2017). Special care should be taken to analyze “in-process” performance (DAF, 
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2017). Even though it is not 100%, the goal of this surveillance method is to adequately 
verify that the contractor is meeting all required performance objectives (DAF, 2017).  
The customer complaint method is an inexpensive method to conduct surveillance 
but requires additional investment in training of personnel (DAF, 2017). Customers who 
receive services should receive training on what the contractor should be doing (DAF, 
2017). Not doing so may generate customer complaints that do not necessarily identify 
performance issues (DAF, 2017). Additional training can also lessen the likelihood of a 
customer inadvertently asking the contractor to provide services that are not part of the 
contract (DAF, 2017). CORs must be cautious in making sure the use of customer 
complaints does not turn into a delegation of their duties to perform surveillance (DAF, 
2017).  
The audit review method is focused on leveraging the contractor’s Quality 
Management System (DAF, 2017) by using their own process outputs. This involves 
inspecting audits conducted by the contractor and making sure they are meeting 
performance requirements, identifying quality issues, and taking initiative to correct any 
deviations in quality (DAF, 2017). The COR should make every effort to schedule their 
surveillance in a period where the reports and metrics would already be prepared by the 
contractor (DAF, 2017).  
Regardless of the methods used for surveillance, the COR should establish a 
schedule to adequately capture the contractor’s overall performance in accordance with 
their contract (DAF, 2017). The schedule can include monthly or quarterly surveillances 
(DAF, 2017). The frequency should be dictated by the time needed to evaluate all critical 
performance measurements and 10%-20% of non-critical performance measurements 
(DAF, 2017). The actual schedule itself must also be treated as “For Official Use Only” in 
order to avoid skewing results (DAF, 2017).  
Once a surveillance is complete, the contractor should have the opportunity to 
respond to discovered performance issues (DAF, 2017). Any lack of correction can be 
documented for future collection in CPARS (DAF, 2017). Furthermore, the COR should 
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document the reasoning behind not conducting surveillance in accordance with completed 
schedules (DAF, 2017).  
The methods described previously, along with the remaining components of the 
QASP, are essential for managing contractor performance. The following section discusses 
the government’s tool for recording contractor performance.  
I. CONTRACTOR PERFORMANCE ASSESSMENT REPORTING SYSTEM 
Organizations need a structured way of evaluating suppliers, such as a scorecard 
(Monczka, 2012). Scorecards are used to make sure certain supplier criteria are met prior 
to awarding a contract and to track supplier performance over time (Monczka, 2012). 
Criteria can include cost control, delivery, quality management, and other qualitative and 
quantitative factors (Monczka, 2012). The government has developed a scorecard system 
for its suppliers and records their ongoing and final performance through the Contractor 
Performance Assessment Reporting System (CPARS). 
CPARS encompass a wide array of data to include contract type, contractor name, 
complexity of effort, value of contract, period of performance, and location (General 
Services Administration, [GSA], 2017). CPARS is used for suppliers delivering supplies, 
large assets (airplanes), systems engineering, construction, and services. The following 
discussion focuses on the performance ratings for services. Once entries are recorded, the 
information is used to determine past performance for a contractor. 
CPARS assesses supplier performance using five different ratings across six or 
more areas of performance (GSA, 2017). These ratings are bolstered with quality and easily 
discernable narratives that support ratings (GSA, 2017). The General Services 
Administration has established five ratings as described below:  
• Exceptional: Performance meets contractual requirements and exceeds 
many to the government’s benefit. The performance element or sub-
elements had few minor problems for which corrective actions were 
highly effective.  
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• Very Good: Performance meets contractual requirements and exceeds 
some to the government’s benefit. The performance element or sub-
element being evaluated was accomplished with minor errors for which 
corrective actions were effective.  
• Satisfactory: Performance meets contractual requirements. The contractual 
performance of the element or sub-element contains some minor problems 
for which corrective actions taken by the contractor appear or were 
satisfactory.  
• Marginal: Performance does not meet some contractual requirements. The 
contractual performance of the element or sub-element being evaluated 
reflects a serious problem for which the contractor has not yet identified 
corrective actions. The contractor’s proposed actions appear only 
marginally effective or were not fully implemented. 
• Unsatisfactory: Performance does not meet most contractual requirements 
and recovery is not likely in a timely manner. The contractual performance 
of the element or sub-element contains a serious problem(s) for which the 
contractor’s corrective actions appear or were ineffective. (GSA, 2017, 
adapted from table on p.48)  
The ratings listed must always be justified through events that generated significant 
proof of the respective level of performance (GSA, 2017). For example, if the contractor 
was rated exceptional, no significant weaknesses must exist in their performance. If 
performance was unsatisfactory, negative results from a management tool should support 
the rating (GSA, 2017). Ratings apply to six or more categories: quality, schedule, cost 
control, management, use of small businesses, regulatory compliance, and other areas 
unique to the contract (GSA, 2017).  
Quality, as it pertains to services, typically involves evaluating operations support 
along with design contracts and construction (GSA, 2017). Areas of consideration include 
whether reports delivered are accurate, services meet specifications or standards laid out in 
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the contract, professional standards are met, and the level of government direction that was 
required when performance problems arose during performance (GSA, 2017).  
Schedule focuses on evaluating the supplier’s timeliness on completing tasks or 
overall contracts. This includes management of work along with meeting particular 
milestones and/or deadlines (GSA, 2017). It also includes contractors correcting schedules 
without government intervention to meet requirements. Finally, the schedule category 
includes whether the contractor communicated schedules and changes via deliverables per 
contract terms (GSA, 2017).  
Cost control focuses on assessing the supplier’s ability to forecast, manage, and 
control costs within a particular contract (GSA, 2017). Furthermore, cost control assesses 
what efforts the contractor takes to effectively manage resources. Specific articles to 
evaluate include accuracy of billing, internal budgetary controls, innovative efforts that 
decrease costs, and whether the contractor notified the government about cost overruns 
(GSA, 2017).  
Management focuses on assessing all integration and coordination efforts to ensure 
a contract is properly executed (GSA, 2017). This includes determining the contractor’s 
orientation with all stakeholders, along with initiative in fixing issues, management of 
property, and management of subcontracts (GSA, 2017). There are also subcategories 
within the management section (GSA, 2017). General Services Agency (2017) describes 
them as:  
• Management responsiveness: The measure of responsive and cooperative 
behavior with the customer and government to ensure positive contract 
outcomes.  
• Subcontract management: The measure of integration of subcontractors 
with prime contractors, efforts to rectify subcontractor problems and to 
prevent them from impacting overall performance, and the compliance of 
subcontractors with regulatory and safety standards.  
 25 
• Program management and other management: The extent to which the 
contractor empowers program managers to complete contracts, along with 
the manner in which the contractor handles risk to include mitigation 
plans.  
• Management of key personnel: The assessment of the contractor’s ability 
to select, retain, support, and replace key personnel for contract efforts. 
This includes using adequate qualification factors for personnel, the 
effectiveness of key personnel, and the adequate replacement of personnel 
by using the same qualifications or exceeding them (GSA, 2017, p. 64).  
Use of small businesses is somewhat unique to the government. This category 
focuses on making sure the contractor is complying with FAR subpart 19.7 and 15 U.S.C. 
§ 637, which contain statutory requirements for including small businesses in some 
contracts (GSA, 2017). This also includes evaluating a contractor’s plan to include small 
businesses in their effort (GSA, 2017).  
Regulatory compliance focuses on making sure the contractor monitors, reports, 
and corrects any issues relating to things like human trafficking, nonpayment of 
subcontractors, tax delinquency, defective cost or pricing data, terminations, and 
suspensions and debarments (GSA, 2017). This also includes the assessment of compliance 
with the Clean Air Act, the Clean Water Act, safety, and labor regulations (GSA, 2017).  
The other areas section is focused on assessing factors that only apply to the 
particular contract an sometimes to cover areas that do not align with the intent of other 
sections of the report (GSA, 2017). Incentive or award fee justifications are usually 
captured in this area along with things such as security compliance (GSA, 2017).  
The government’s implementation of a scorecard system is pivotal in the 
management of contractor performance to guide future procurement. The most important 
factor of their scorecard system is the fact that the contractor has an opportunity to provide 
input about their ratings in a manner to object or concur (GSA, 2017). Contractor 
comments ensure that ratings are fair, accurate, and transparent for all parties involved 
(GSA, 2017). 
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The completion of evaluations in CPARS is a critical component of the quality 
assurance program. CPARS makes it possible to manage contractor performance. The 
following section describes the issues that the DoD has encountered in managing contractor 
performance due to failures within their quality assurance program. 
J. CURRENT ISSUES WITH THE MANAGEMENT OF CONTRACTOR 
PERFORMANCE 
The DoD IG and GAO revealed several flaws in DoD’s implementation of 
contractor surveillance and quality assurance of contractors. The DoD IG considers 
contractor management and oversight to be one of its top management challenges (DoD 
IG, 2017b). Furthermore, the GAO concludes that the DoD’s contract management, as part 
of its High-Risk Series, could be done more effectively (GAO, 2017b).  
In FY2015, the DoD IG identified that challenges still exist in having adequate 
contractor oversight on service contracts, even though they represent over 50% of contract 
spend (DoD IG, 2015). Furthermore, they discovered that the DoD’s lead agency for 
contract management, the Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA), did not have 
an overarching quality management policy in that same year (DoD IG, 2015b). The DoD 
IG also discovered that the feedback mechanisms to implement process improvement did 
not exist at the department head level or in the individual branches of the military (DoD 
IG, 2015b).  
The GAO discovered significant issues in the way CPARS is used across the DoD. 
GAO discovered that Army leadership failed to use CPARS data to determine the quality 
and impact contractors delivered to its operational forces (GAO, 2017a). The justification 
was that the Army’s perception was a lack of trust in adequate use of CPARS, or in other 
words, inaccurate contractor ratings (GAO, 2017a). The DoD IG also discovered that the 
DoD did a poor job of preparing narratives to support CPARS ratings between 2013 and 
2016 (DoD IG, 2017). The DoD was also negligent in rating all required assessment factors 
and accurately describing contract efforts within CPARS (DoD IG, 2017a). More 
importantly, the DoD IG discovered that CPARS entries were on average 73 days late, 
effectively barring source selection officials from having accurate contractor past 
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performance data (DoD IG, 2017a). One of the main reasons for the aforementioned 
findings is a lack of effective CPARS training within the workforce (DoD IG, 2017a).  
The DoD finds itself struggling with contractor oversight even though it has 
established COR training and experience standards. One of the most significant 
deficiencies discovered by the DoD IG was that CORs did not have sufficient training in 
completing CPARS reports (DoD IG, 2017a). Insufficient training leads to inadequate 
reporting, which hinders the use of past performance, through CPARS, for source selection. 
Additional issues are prevalent when monitoring services. For example, operations in U.S. 
African Command (U.S. AFRICOM) did not adequately account for its contractor 
personnel, nor did it do a proper job of mitigating operational risks when selecting 
contractors (GAO, 2015). The GAO also discovered that AFRICOM did not have proper 
operational contract support (OCS) training, which includes government oversight, and the 
subordinate command levels (GAO, 2015). Lack of OCS training significantly damages 
the capability of the COR to plan and perform oversight for service contracts.  
The issues the DoD currently experiences with contractor oversight have a 
significant impact on its ability to manage service contracts in the future. As a result of 
these issues, the DoD is more vulnerable to contractor fraud waste and abuse due to lack 
of oversight, as well as the potential for adverse selection of contractors because of 
untimely and improperly prepared past performance information.  
The issues discussed in this section were identified by government agencies. The 
following section discusses previous studies conducted by the academic sector.  
K. PREVIOUS STUDIES 
Several studies have been conducted on the DoD’s contract management processes. 
All have had a limited scope due to time and lack of data. Even so, many have yielded 
positive results.  
A Navy-centric study focused on the contract management process provided results 
demonstrating that there is room for improvement in contract administration and closeout 
(Rendon, 2015). The research was conducted through qualitative means and involved 
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surveying process maturity via surveys to 185 Navy contracting officers. Based on the 
Contract Management Maturity Model (CMMM), contract administration and closeout 
processes were rated at the low end of process maturity (basic level). In other words, the 
level of maturity of the process would not necessarily guarantee planned results (Rendon, 
2015). Recommendations from this study included institutionalizing processes and 
increased training for contract administration personnel, including the COR (Rendon, 
2015).  
An Army-centric study that focused on the contract administration process yielded 
results that amplified the differences in quality assurance between Contiguous U.S. and 
Outside Continental U.S. (CONUS and OCONUS) environments (Peel & Acevedo, 2016). 
The study revealed that most OCONUS CORs focused extensively on quality assurance 
and technical oversight while CONUS CORs were more focused on completing 
administrative duties (Peel & Acevedo, 2016). Both technical surveillance and 
administrative proficiencies are required to produce adequate records of contract 
performance (Peel & Acevedo, 2016). The study also discovered that COR training and 
allotment of time for duties was not universal across the Army (Peel & Acevedo, 2016). 
Recommendations from this study included improving overall COR human capital, 
training, and communication among staff and contractors. It also concluded that oversight 
and leadership support is needed to increase both CONUS and OCONUS (Peel & Acevedo, 
2016).  
Additional research has shown that the titles of individuals tasked with monitoring 
contractor surveillance is not the same across the board. For example, the Navy places 
contracting officers in charge of surveillance instead of CORs, while the Army and Air 
Force used CORs instead of contracting officers (Rendon, Apte, & Apte, 2012). The same 
study revealed that the Air Force had CORs with less than three years of experience 
performing surveillance duties, while the Navy had CORs with over three years of 
experience performing surveillance duties (Rendon, Apte, & Apte, 2012).  
Another study, focused on the Navy, was conducted using an interview and survey 
format to determine the definition of service contract success (Miller, 2012). The study 
revealed that there was not a uniform definition of success across the three naval 
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contracting commands (Miller, 2012). The study also concluded that CORs were not 
significantly involved in the pre-award phase of the acquisition process, yet were expected 
to be the eyes and ears of the taxpayer to ensure contractor compliance (Miller, 2012). 
Furthermore, the program managers interviewed in the study placed an emphasis on quality 
assurance in reporting, yet DoD institutional goals only required the completion of QASPs 
for contracts over simplified acquisition threshold and CPARS for contracts over $1 
million, which was only a little over 20% of the spend analyzed in the study (Miller, 2012). 
The study revealed that even though quality assurance is important, it is only formally used 
for a small portion of the total money spent on contracts (Miller, 2012).  
Another Army-focused study attempted to determine a relationship between service 
types, contract types, levels of competition, and recorded contractor performance in 
CPARS (Hart, 2013). The study revealed that the dollar amounts and levels of competition 
highly affected ratings in CPARS (Hart, 2013). More importantly, they discovered that 
failure rates were not high within CPARS (Hart, 2013). The study discovered that using 
cost reimbursement contracts had a much higher failure rate than others. Furthermore, lack 
of competition further increased the likelihood of a contract failing (Hart, 2013). Even 
though this was an extensive study, the study did not find any relationships between quality 
assurance systems and overall contractor ratings in CPARS (Hart, 2013).  
Thus, previous studies have attempted to find a relationship between contract 
management (to include quality assurance) and CPARS ratings. The remainder of this 
research discusses the impact of the quality assurance program on contractor performance.  
L. SUMMARY 
The purpose of this research is to determine how the quality assurance program 
(COR experience, training, surveillance frequency, and QASPs) impacts contractor 
performance. This chapter set the foundation for this research by discussing the theoretical 
basis for analyzing the government’s quality assurance program and contractor 
performance. Furthermore, the chapter discussed the service contracting process. 
Additionally, this chapter introduced key members of the service contracting team along 
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with training and experience requirements for CORs. Moreover, this chapter introduced 
the clauses and guidance that enables the management of contractor performance.  
This chapter also discussed how the QASP and included surveillance methods make 
up the quality assurance program. Additionally, this chapter introduced CPARS, along with 
current issues the DoD faces in managing contractor performance. Finally, this chapter 
discussed previous studies conducted in an attempt to define the relationship between the 
government’s quality assurance program and contractor performance.  
The following chapter explains the research methodology used to determine how 
the quality assurance program (COR experience, training, surveillance frequency, and 
QASPs) impacts contractor performance.  
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III. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this research is to determine how the quality assurance program 
(COR experience, training, surveillance frequency, and QASPs) impacts contractor 
performance. This chapter discusses the sample and sampling method used when data was 
extracted from recorded U.S. Air Force services contracts. Furthermore, this chapter 
discusses the operationalization of response, explanatory, and control variables. Figure 2 
provides a concept of the proposed research methodology.  
 
Figure 2.  Conceptual Model of Research Methodology  
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B. SAMPLE 
The unit of analysis for this research was the quality assurance program and 
contractor performance data for installation service contracts. A sample of 30 quality 
assurance programs and contractor performance data for installation service contracts was 
taken from the U.S. Air Force contracted installation services portfolio. The sample 
contains sufficient information about the quality assurance program and contractor 
performance to conduct research on how a quality assurance program impacts contractor 
performance.  
1. Data Collection 
Data collection began by identifying the systems that could provide the data needed 
to determine the impact of the quality assurance program on contractor performance. The 
CORTT system provided data for the government’s quality assurance system. The CPARS 
system provided data for contractor performance. Once systems were identified, three 
military installations were chosen to provide data. Each installation provided 10 service 
contracts with corresponding CORTT and CPARS data. 
The first set of data was collected in person from the Quality Assurance Program 
Coordinator (QAPC) within a contracting squadron. This was done to validate that the 
systems and the manager of those systems could provide all necessary data. Additional sets 
were collected via a data call using an Excel spreadsheet, which is available for review in 
Appendix 4.  
The CORTT system was used to derive information about the COR’s surveillance 
and technical experience, training, and surveillance frequency. Furthermore, CORTT 
provided access to the QASPs for each contracted service.  
The CPARS provided contractor performance data. The data included each service 
contract’s complexity, total dollar value, and respective performance ratings for each of 
the three main categories listed in CPARS: quality, schedule, and management. Cost was 
not assessed because the sample only contained firm fixed price. Firm fixed price contracts 
do not typically have cost as a performance of measure. CPARS also provided a description 
of each contracted service. Additional categories existed within CPARS, such as small 
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business and regulatory. They were excluded from the study due to the lack of uniformity 
across the data set—not all contracts were evaluated in those areas.  
Finally, the sample included sensitive source selection information (SSI), which 
required sanitation. All contractor, COR, and contracting officer names were removed to 
protect SSI. Furthermore, the military installations from which the data was extracted are 
not named within this research. This section discussed the methods used to take a sample 
from the population of installation contracted services. The following section will provide 
additional details about the sample. 
2. Additional Sample Details 
This section describes additional details about the sample. This section also 
includes data means, standard deviations, and correlations.  
The sample contained a wide variety of installation services in order to avoid bias 
toward one particular service type. The sample also included common services such as 
grounds maintenance, custodial, and laundry. The sample also consisted of unique services 
such as corrosion control, architect and engineering, and demolition services. Additional 
unique services included courseware development for space operations, teleradiology 
network, linear accelerator services, and software maintenance.  
Despite the DoD’s approach to standardization, three grounds maintenance services 
had different variables. The one grounds maintenance contract that scored a satisfactory in 
CPARS had the COR with the most surveillance experience (20 years). The remaining two 
grounds maintenance contracts had CORs with relatively high surveillance experience (9 
and 13 years, respectively), yet their contracts were scored as exceptional.  
Even though the contract requirements were different, they all held one attribute 
constant: contract type. The sample only includes firm fixed price contracts. The exclusion 
of other contract types was a deliberate choice to avoid large variation available in 
independent variables (Quality Assurance Program attributes). Contracts other than firm 
fixed price tend to have CORs assigned along with quality assurance personnel that 
significantly impact their ability to surveil contract performance.  
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The overall dollar value of services had a wide range with a mean of $20.9 million 
and a standard deviation of about $60 million.  
Another strange distribution for the sample included performance ratings which 
consisted mostly of very good or exceptional ratings with zero unsatisfactory ratings. 
Furthermore, every CPARS rating contained the contractor’s concurrence, which means 
that the contractor, although part of a bilateral decision, gave concurrence every time 
regardless of the rating given. The histogram in Figure 3 displays the current performance 
averages within the sample.  
 
Note: 3 = Satisfactory, 4 = Very Good, 5 = Exceptional in terms of contractor performance. 
Figure 3.  CPARS Average Current Performance 
Moreover, several CORs performed surveillance on contracts for which they did 
not have the necessary technical experience (technical experience is described in the 
following section). Even so, CORs who were performing quality assurance functions had 
a wide range of surveillance/contracting experience ranging from one year to 20 years.  
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Additionally, surveillance frequency was listed as monthly. Even so, the quantity 
of reports in CORTT varied significantly. Some contracts had as few as six surveillance 
reports, while the max in the sample was 32. The variance in the number of reports was 
significant because all the contracts had a one-year period of performance with monthly 
surveillance schedules. This is significant because it demonstrates how well CORs 
followed their QASPs. 
A careful review of QASPs also demonstrated that most contracts had an equally 
thought-out approach to managing contractor performance. There were zero QASPs that 
did not meet DoD standards (operationalization described in the following section). 
Unfortunately, only seven contracts had sufficient detail to demonstrate purposeful 
planning that aligned with the specific contract.  
Finally, the following variables, although likely to influence contractor 
performance, were excluded from the principal model:  
• contract dollar value 
• complexity 
• acquisition method 
• specific surveillance methods  
• contract type  
• contractor experience  
Table 1 includes means, standard deviations, and correlations for all the variables 
used in determining the impact of the quality assurance program on contractor 
performance. 
 36 
Table 1.   Descriptive Statistics for Variables in Model 
 
*Note: n = 30 
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C. OPERATIONALIZATION OF VARIABLES 
Deciphering the impact that the quality assurance program (COR experience, 
training, surveillance frequency, and QASP) has on contractor performance required 
establishing response and explanatory variables. Furthermore, it required implementing 
statistical controls. Model development also required the transformation of qualitative data 
into quantitative data. This section will describe the applicable variables along with their 
transformation, statistical controls, and transformation of data.  
1. Response Variables 
The purpose of this research is to determine how explanatory variables impact 
contractor performance. Contractor performance is gained from determining overall ratings 
in CPARS. The variables used for this research include contractor performance regarding 
quality, schedule, and management. These variables were transformed into quantitative 
data by assigning a numerical value (one through five) based on the rating recorded within 
CPARS. One was assigned for unsatisfactory performance, two for marginal, three for 
satisfactory, four for very good, and five for exceptional. Furthermore, in order to facilitate 
linear regression, the response variables are combined into one average of the recorded 
performance areas.  
2. Explanatory Variables 
Explanatory variables that represent the quality assurance system and contribute to 
contractor performance included COR technical experience, surveillance/contracting 
experience, training, surveillance frequency, and the quality of the QASP.  
COR regulations and policy listed in the literature review identify the need for 
CORs to have technical experience. Even so, it is not always likely that a technically savvy 
COR will be assigned to a corresponding contract. Data collected from CORTT revealed 
the Air Force Specialty Code (AFSC) of the respective COR. If the AFSC was closely 
associated with the service description, a one was assigned to the variable. If not, a zero 
was assigned. 
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Another factor that was taken into play was the number of years of experience a 
COR had in fulfilling contracting and surveillance related actions. This was determined 
based on overall nomination and renewals in CORTT, along with short phone 
conversations validating the information in the system. The variable was assigned a 
corresponding integer based on the total years they had performed COR duties. 
Additionally, the frequency of surveillances completed for the contract were extracted from 
CORTT and tallied numerically. 
The final COR variable extracted from CORTT was whether they had completed 
the required training; the majority of the CORs within the sample had completed training. 
This was because it is not likely a COR will be assigned without training. Even so, three 
observations within the sample had CORs with no training.  
The remaining variable from CORTT, the quality of the QASP, underwent 
additional consideration before converting into qualitative data. Based on the discussion 
within the literature review, a one, two, or three was awarded to the QASP. If the QASP 
outlined the minimum surveillance requirements to address specific risks areas, it was 
awarded a one. If the document demonstrated additional considerations for the contract, 
such as a specific surveillance schedule, or exclusion or emphasis on a certain surveillance 
method, clear list of responsible parties, it was awarded a two. If the QASP demonstrated 
meticulous and specific examples of how surveillance would be conducted, it was awarded 
a three.  
3. Controls  
One of the most notable controls in the model is contractor concurrence and 
comments against ratings. The CPARS system currently allows for a bilateral exchange to 
happen prior to ratings being finalized. Although highly unlikely, the contractor may not 
concur with ratings. To control for this, all of the samples used in this study included 
contractor concurrence of the CPARS report.  
D. MODEL SPECIFICATION 
The following is the model specified for the purpose of this research: 
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YKT_PRFMC=𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1XCORSE + 𝛽𝛽2XCORTE + 𝛽𝛽3XCORTRNG + 𝛽𝛽4XSF + 𝛽𝛽5XQASP_Q  
KT_PRFMC = Contractor Performance 
CORSE = COR Surveillance Experience 
CORTE = COR Technical Experience 
CORTRNG = COR Training 
SF = Surveillance Frequency 
QASP_Q = QASP Quality 
E. SUMMARY 
The purpose of this research is to determine how the quality assurance program 
(COR experience, training, surveillance frequency, and QASPs) impacts contractor 
performance. This chapter discussed the data collection methods used to determine how 
the quality assurance program (COR experience, training, surveillance frequency, and 
QASPs) impacts overall contractor performance. This chapter also discussed additional 
sample details that give clarity to the scope of the study. The chapter also discussed the 
methods used to operationalize variables, such as the quality of a QASP. Furthermore, it 
discussed the proposed model for analysis. The following chapter presents and analyzes 
the results of the operationalization of the data.  
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IV. ANALYSIS  
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter presents and analyzes the sample collected in order to determine how 
the quality assurance program (COR experience, training, surveillance frequency, and 
QASPs) impacts contractor performance. It discusses an overview of results from a 
statistical perspective and presents answers to the research questions. Finally, the chapter 
provides some implications based on the research.  
B. OVERVIEW OF RESULTS 
The sample of quality assurance programs and contractor performance ratings 
consisted of 30 unique contracts. The R-Squared value shows that 36.85% of variation 
within the line are explained by the explanatory variables. The majority of explanatory 
variables had significantly high P>|t| value results, which are explained in the following 
sections. Figure 4 displays the summary of the linear regression.  
 
Figure 4.  Regression Analysis 
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C. ANALYSIS OF FINDINGS 
The purpose of this research is to determine how the government quality assurance 
program (experience, training, surveillance frequency, and quality plan) impacts contractor 
performance. The regression analysis displayed above led to the following findings.  
1. Impact of COR Experience on Contractor Performance 
The regression conducted above shows a statistically significant relationship, 
within the sample, between COR technical experience on contractor performance. The p-
value was .014, which is less than the typically accepted .05 for statistically significant 
information. The regression further reveals that average contractor performance increases 
.629 if the COR has technical experience in the requirement compared to no experience 
within the sample.  
COR surveillance experience, although varied, resulted in a p-value of .680. The 
value demonstrates that surveillance experience does not represent a statistically significant 
impact on contractor performance within the sample. The high p-value demonstrates that 
there is no conclusive evidence on how COR surveillance experience affects contractor 
performance.  
2. Impact of COR Training on Contractor Performance 
The regression analysis conducted revealed a p-value of .879 for the sample. The 
results indicate that there is no statistically significant evidence that COR training directly 
impacts contractor performance within the sample. The high p-value does not provide 
sufficient information to determine the impact that COR training has on contractor 
performance within the sample or the population.  
3. Impact of Surveillance Frequency on Contractor Performance 
The regression analysis conducted revealed a p-value of .196 for the sample. The 
results indicate that there is no statistically significant evidence that surveillance frequency 
directly impacts contractor performance within the sample. Furthermore, the results are 
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inconclusive as to whether surveillance frequency negatively or positively impacts 
contractor performance within the population.  
4. Impact of Quality of Surveillance Plan on Contractor Performance 
The regression analysis conducted revealed a p-value of .173 for the sample. The 
results indicate that there is no statistically significant evidence that surveillance frequency 
directly impacts contractor performance within the sample. The high p-value does not 
allow for conclusions to be made about how the quality assurance surveillance plan impacts 
contractor performance.  
Based on the high p-values associated with most variables, it is difficult to 
determine how the factors listed above impact contractor performance. Even so, the 
research has pertinent implications that are discussed in the next section.  
D. IMPLICATIONS OF FINDINGS  
The statistical significance discovered in COR technical experience reveals 
important factors to consider when assigning CORs to post award functions, such as 
managing contractor performance. Perhaps selecting CORs with technical experience 
could result in the identification and correction of issues prior to the reporting period for 
CPARS. A COR with technical experience is more likely to understand the mechanics with 
performing a contract requirement alongside the actual performance objective. For 
example, if a contractor is asked to maintain a readiness level of 95% for vehicles, a 
technically experienced COR may understand that doing so requires rotation of vehicles, 
and a diverse skill set among mechanics (electrical, fuel systems, mechanical, etc.). This 
could assist the COR in validating performance by focusing on observing the labor force 
makeup and knowledge base more so than paper records of performed maintenance. In a 
perfect world, the COR would be able to physically validate a maintenance task due to their 
technical experience.  
Another critical implication, although outside of this model, is how COR technical 
experience can impact multiple phases of the contracting cycle. A COR’s technical 
experience can have significant benefit during the pre-award phase. The COR’s technical 
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experience could lead to developing Performance Work Statements (PWS) and QASPs that 
enable contract success. Technical experience could ensure that product, exchange, and 
governance rules are adequately incorporated for a specific contract. For example, a 
technically experienced COR could outline specific methods for completing grounds 
maintenance tasks. A COR would also be able to select the appropriate surveillance method 
to validate contractor performance, such as in process inspections vs. random sampling.  
A COR’s technical experience can also result in benefits during the award phase. 
Technical experience could aid in technical evaluations of offeror proposals. Their 
technical expertise could help the procurement team avoid adverse selection by having the 
COR critically analyze technical solutions proposed by the offeror. The COR’s technical 
expertise could also assist in discussions by being able to translate technical information 
into language that contracting can use to create a negotiation position.  
Speculation can be made about the remaining variables even though the regression 
did not demonstrate statistically significant results. For example, QASP quality and 
surveillance frequency did not result in a low enough p-value; even so, agency theory states 
that well-defined governance rules tend to reduce discretionary behavior. A reduction in 
discretionary behavior makes it possible for both the principal and agent to reach a win-
win outcome after contract completion. QASP quality and surveillance frequency are both 
products of governance rules. On the other hand, QASP quality and surveillance frequency 
could arguably lead to the identification of more issues with contractors, which would 
lower contractor performance, as recorded in CPARS.  
Similar speculations can be made about COR surveillance experience and training. 
Even though both explanatory variables did not result in a p-value < .05, they are still likely 
to impact contractor performance. Their impact on contractor performance can be 
discerned from the fact that adequate training and experience by personnel form part of the 
auditability triangle (Rendon, 2015). The auditability triangle makes it possible for 
organizations to perform procurement-related activities such as contract administration, 
which includes management of contractor performance. Furthermore, surveillance 
experience could lead a COR to be assigned to higher risk contracts, which would leave 
lower risk installation level contracts with CORs who have less surveillance experience. A 
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COR with less surveillance experience may miss particular contractor performance issues. 
On the other hand, a COR with additional surveillance experience is more likely to catch 
errors in contractor performance, which could lead to a lower observed contractor 
performance. This may have been the cause of a high p-value within the model.  
Additionally, training could result in a change in contractor performance due to a 
COR leveraging institutional and procedural knowledge while performing contractor 
surveillance. A COR without the requisite training may not understand how to adequately 
fill out CPARS, which can give a contractor room to rebut negative ratings and achieve 
higher contract performance. Similarly, a COR with training is more likely to understand 
how to structure a CPARS narrative, which could lead to a sustained low rating of a 
contractor in CPARS.  
The r-squared value of the model also indicates that additional explanatory 
variables may exist that have an impact on contractor performance. One of the variables 
includes previous contractor performance. The correlation matrix listed in Chapter III 
demonstrated that previous and current performance were highly correlated within the 
sample. It is likely that a contractor that does well in one period will do so in another.  
A key implication is also that CPARS inputs may not be the most accurate measure 
of contractor performance. As discussed in the previous studies section within Chapter II, 
the government has been criticized for failing to complete CPARS and for the lack of detail 
contained within the narratives (GAO, 2017a; DoD IG, 2017). This is demonstrated within 
the sample, which did not contain much variance within contractor performance 
averages—most of the contractors were rated as satisfactory.  
The results of this research reveal that COR technical experience within the sample 
had an impact on contractor performance. The results also lead to a multitude of 
implications and speculations deduced from the data and linear regression. The following 
section will summarize this chapter.  
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E. SUMMARY 
This chapter discussed and analyzed the sample collected in order to determine how 
the quality assurance program (COR experience, training, surveillance frequency, and 
QASPs) impacts contractor performance. The chapter also presented an overview of results 
from a statistical perspective. Furthermore, the chapter discussed an analysis of the 
findings. Finally, this chapter discussed implications of the findings. The following chapter 
summarizes the research, presenting a conclusion and recommendations for future 
research.  
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V. SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND AREAS FOR FURTHER 
RESEARCH 
A. SUMMARY 
The purpose of this research was to determine how the quality assurance program 
(COR experience, training, surveillance frequency, and QASPs) impacts contractor 
performance. The research began with a problem statement and purpose. It presented 
research questions surrounding the purpose of this research and continued by introducing 
the methodology, benefits, limitations, and organization of the report.  
This research continued with a thorough literature review on the subject of quality 
assurance programs and contractor performance, including a discussion of agency and 
auditability theory to set the theoretical framework. Literature surrounding the service 
contracting process and key personnel was also presented to set the foundation for the 
research. Furthermore, quality assurance methods and systems of record were discussed to 
demonstrate how the DoD implements quality assurance programs. Moreover, issues with 
the management of contractor performance were presented to demonstrate the need to 
understand the impact of the quality assurance systems on contractor performance. Finally, 
the literature review discussed previous studies surrounding the purpose of this research.  
This research continued by discussing the methodology used to determine the 
impact of the quality assurance program on contractor performance. The chapter on 
methodology explained how the sample was taken from the population and then described 
the 30 samples collected from three installations. It also described the sample in detail to 
include descriptive statistics, a histogram of contractor performance, and prevalent sample 
details. Additionally, the research methodology presented the operationalization of 
response (contractor performance) and control variables (quality assurance program). 
Finally, the methodology section described the model used to perform regression analysis 
on the sample.  
This research continued by presenting an analysis of the linear regression. The 
analysis included an overview of the linear regression outcomes to include a review of r-
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squared of the regression, p-values of explanatory variables, and coefficients for 
statistically significant variables. The r-squared for the overall model was .3685, which 
demonstrated that over 60% of variables outside of the model may explain CPARS values. 
Furthermore, only COR technical experience demonstrated statistically significant 
information, showing that if a COR has technical experience (instead of no experience) the 
contractor performance is likely to increase by .629. The remaining explanatory variables 
demonstrated no statistical significance due to high p-values within the model.  
The analysis concluded by discussing implications of the research results, including 
the importance of assigning technically experienced CORs to contract requirements. 
Technical experience could support proper quality assurance of processes and technical 
performance. Furthermore, a COR’s technical experience could assist in developing PWSs, 
QASPs, and other acquisition documents that set up the contractor for success. The paper 
also discussed how theory still suggests that the other explanatory variables may be 
relevant.  
The analysis also included additional information explaining high p-values. 
Discussion included potential impacts on contractor performance if other explanatory 
variables were high or low and how either value may have been cause for statistically 
inconclusive results within the sample. Finally, the analysis concluded with an explanation 
of how CPARS may not be the best measurement of contractor performance because it 
incorporates contractor concurrence and issues brought up by the GAO in 2017.  
In summary, the purpose of this research was to determine how the quality 
assurance program (COR experience, training, surveillance frequency, and QASPs) 
impacts contractor performance. The following section discusses conclusions of this 
research. 
B. CONCLUSIONS 
The purpose of this research was to determine how the government quality 
assurance program (experience, training, surveillance frequency, and quality plan) impacts 
contractor performance. This research revealed a multitude of findings that answer the 
questions proposed in Chapter I. The research also resulted in significant implications that 
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may assist in improving the quality assurance system and contractor performance. The 
answers to the research questions, along with additional findings and implications, are 
discussed in this section.  
• What is the relationship between the government monitor experience and 
contractor performance? Government monitor; the COR, technical 
experience has a positive effect on contractor performance. The results 
from the model are inconclusive as to the impact of surveillance 
experience on contractor performance.  
• What is the relationship between government monitor training and 
contractor performance? The results from the model are inconclusive as to 
the impact of government monitor training; the COR, on contractor 
performance. 
• What is the relationship between the surveillance frequency, quality plan 
and contractor performance? The results from the model are inconclusive 
as to the impact of surveillance frequency, quality plans, and contractor 
performance.  
The sample collected demonstrated that the proposed model shows that only COR 
technical experience has a statistically significant impact on contractor performance within 
the sample. The statistically significant impact demonstrates that technical experience may 
produce benefits across pre-award, award, and post-award phases of the contracting cycle.  
Higher COR technical experience in pre-award include the likelihood of stronger 
performance work statements and quality assurance surveillance plans which can be 
structured to enable higher contractor performance. Pre-award benefits derived from COR 
technical experience can also lead to well-structured product, exchange, and governance 
rules that reduce room for discretionary behavior, which ultimately leads to higher 
contractor performance.  
A COR with higher technical experience during the award phase can help the 
government avoid adverse selection. Higher COR technical experience could result in 
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successful technical evaluations, which can lead to selecting a contractor who is more 
likely to perform well. Higher COR technical experience can also result in productive 
discussions, leading to the contracting activity being more prepared to negotiate and award 
a contract.  
Additionally, a COR with higher technical experience can have a significant benefit 
to the post award phase of the contracting cycle. Technical experience can lead to more 
thorough surveillance of contractors and the ability to adequately capture performance 
issues.  
Moreover, even though the remaining explanatory variables did not produce 
statistically significant results, it is still likely that they impact the population based on 
theories discussed within this research. For example, surveillance experience and COR 
training are concepts used in the auditability triangle, which assesses an organization’s 
ability to perform procurement-related activities. The explanatory variables may yield 
statistically significant results if a larger sample is taken.  
This section summarizes the findings of this research. The following section 
discusses areas for further research.  
C. AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
One of the most critical recommendations for further research is to conduct an in-
depth analysis of why CPARS contains mostly positive ratings. This research could include 
a comparison between departments in the federal government along with an analysis of 
ratings over several years. 
Another recommendation for further research is to see how training, experience, 
and contract type affect the narratives placed in CPARS. The study of narrative detail could 
reveal why poor ratings may fail to be recorded once a contractor’s input is given to the 
contracting officer. For example, a lack of narrative for poor performance may give the 
contractor room to articulate why they deserve very good or exceptional ratings.  
Furthermore, research could be conducted with the same model with a significantly 
larger sample size. The larger sample can begin by capturing all Air Force installation 
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contracts. An additional sample can be taken from other DoD entities. Finally, a sample of 
the entire DoD population could also further this research. The results of a regression on a 
larger sample may reveal a stronger relationship between explanatory and response 
variables.  
Other research could include determining different ways in which the government 
can record contractor performance, such as the score card system discussed in the literature 
review chapter. A unilateral system such as a score card may lend itself to a more accurate 
representation of perceived performance versus the bilateral nature of CPARS.  
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APPENDIX. COR TRAINING REQUIREMENTS 
Table 2.   DoD Standard for Certification of CORs—Type A. Source: DoD (2015).  
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Table 3.   DoD Standard for Certification of CORs—Type B. Source: DoD (2015). 
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